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1
1 introduction
Richard Arena, Agnès Festré and 
Nathalie Lazaric
in 1937, friedrich von Hayek wrote what was to become a very famous 
article, which was published in Economica, on the relations between eco-
nomics and knowledge. it was admired by the economics profession, but 
its direct influence on economic theory at the time was limited. fifty years 
later, with the emergence of the so- called ‘knowledge- based economy’, 
many of von Hayek’s preoccupations were revisited, and this has given 
birth to a large literature dedicated to the role of knowledge within eco-
nomic relations. The economic reality questions the economic theory. The 
concept of the knowledge- based economy has generated a new ‘economics 
of knowledge’ or ‘economics of science’. This has prompted greater reflec-
tion on the notion of knowledge in analytical areas such as game theory, 
innovation theory, organization theory, firm theory, spatial economics 
and growth theory. However, it is not certain whether the numerous con-
tributions on these issues have contributed to a better understanding of the 
key questions related to the notion of knowledge in economics.
1.1  THE micRoEconomics of infoRmaTion, 
knowlEdgE and gEnERal Economic 
EQUilibRiUm THEoRY
The research programme that dominated economic analysis for more 
than one hundred years – general economic equilibrium theory (gEET) 
– did not pay attention to the notion of knowledge, and instead focused 
on information. The argument put forward to justify this focus was that 
information could be measured. information theory (see shannon, 1948) 
emphasizes that information can and must be codified in order to be trans-
mitted through a digital system. Van Ha (1999, p. 1) notes:
information has the property of reducing the uncertainty of a situation. The 
measurement of information is thus the measurement of the uncertainty. That 
measurement is called Entropy. if entropy is large, then a large amount of infor-
mation is required to clarify the situation. if entropy is small, then only a small 
amount of information is required for clarification.
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within this framework, computer scientists interested in measuring the 
volume or weight of information to be transmitted refer to the minimal 
number of ‘bits’ needed to transmit some piece of information (a bit being 
the measure of the smallest amount of computer information storage).
microeconomic theorists, on the other hand, tend to maintain that 
knowledge cannot be measured. They generally do not consider practical 
means for measuring information, although they do concede that infor-
mation can be coded and is measurable while knowledge is not. However, 
it should also be emphasized that some economists do not consider the 
notion of quantitative information to be relevant. for instance arrow 
(1974, p. 38, quoted in garrouste, 2001) stated:
this definition of information is qualitative, and so it will remain for the pur-
poses of this volume. The quantitative definition which appears in information 
theory is probably of only limited value for economic analysis, for reasons 
pointed out by marschak; different bits of information equal from the view-
point of information theory, will usually have very different benefits or costs. 
Thus let a and b be any two statements about the world, for neither of which is 
its truth or falsity known a priori. Then a signal that a is true conveys exactly 
as much information, in the sense of shannon, as the statement that b is true. 
but the value of knowing whether or not a is true may be vastly greater than 
the value of knowing b’s truth- value; or it may be that the resources needed to 
ascertain the truth- value of a are much greater than those for b. in either case, 
the information- theoretic equivalence of the two possible signals conceals their 
vast economic difference.
another reason why gEET research preferred the concept of informa-
tion over the notion of knowledge is related to the characterization of 
this concept within walrasian economics. in such a theoretical context 
information was considered objective and symmetric, that is, the same for 
all economic agents. it was seen also as complete, implying that the agents 
agreed perfectly on a common characterization of all possible states of 
the world. it was assumed to be perfect because it was being defined in a 
world where all the data related to problems of agent- individual choices 
are known. and finally, the combination of these properties was the basis 
for making individual rational choices.
Even after the gEET research programme was discontinued, informa-
tion or its equivalent – coded or codified knowledge – continued for some 
economists to be more attractive than other forms of knowledge. The ‘new 
economics of science’ emerged in the 1990s (dasgupta and david, 1994; 
david and foray, 1995; cowan and foray, 1997), an approach that com-
bined mainstream microeconomic analysis with contributions from new 
institutionalism, and identified information as codified knowledge and 
treated it as a commodity.
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1.2 PERsonal and TaciT knowlEdgE
There were some, however, who could not accept this identification, on 
the grounds, first, that some knowledge is tacit. in Polanyi’s Personal 
Knowledge, tacit knowledge is described as ‘unarticulated’ knowledge, 
which underlies ‘the aim of a skilful performance’ (Polanyi, 1962, chs 4 
and 5), which aim ‘is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which 
are not known as such to the person following them’ (ibid., p. 49). Tacit 
knowledge cannot be reduced to these ‘rules’: ‘Rules of art can be useful, 
but they do not determine the practice of an art; they are maxims, which 
can serve as a guide to an art only if they can be integrated into the prac-
tical knowledge of the art. They cannot replace this knowledge’ (ibid., 
p. 50). There is no clear dichotomy between tacit and explicit forms of 
knowledge in Polanyi’s approach. Polanyi maintains that articulated or 
explicit knowledge always requires focal awareness since it implies a fully 
conscious attitude. However, if tacit knowledge requires subsidiary aware-
ness, this is not to imply entirely unconscious behaviour: ‘it [tacit knowl-
edge] can exist at any level of consciousness, ranging from the subliminal 
to the fully conscious. what makes awareness subsidiary is its functional 
character’ (Polanyi, 1975, p. 39). This explains why tacit assessments and 
judgements are required at every step in the acquisition of – even codified – 
knowledge (ibid., p. 31). from this point of view, there is no purely explicit 
knowledge; in other words, knowledge is always personal knowledge.
second, for Polanyi, the introduction of tacit knowledge is strongly 
related to ‘personal knowledge’. according to Polanyi, knowledge can be 
seen as the product of subjectivity. ‘Personal knowledge’ refers to knowl-
edge anchored in individuals and is the product of personal commitment. 
for example, before the scientist becomes committed to ‘pure’ research 
he or she has a personal vision and an intuition, which are constrained by 
the tradition of the particular discipline. some of the assumptions made, 
according to Polanyi, were due largely to the ‘logic of tacit inference’:
Upon examining the grounds on which science is pursued, i saw that its 
progress is determined at every stage by indefinable powers of thoughts. no 
rule can account for the way a good idea is found for starting an inquiry, and 
there are no firm rules either for the verification or the refutation of the pro-
posed solution of a problem . . . it appears then that scientific discovery cannot 
be achieved by explicit inference, nor can its true claims be explicitly stated. 
discovery must be arrived at by tacit powers of the mind and its content, so far 
as it is indeterminate, can be only tacitly known. (Polanyi, 1964, p. 138)
Tacit knowledge, therefore, is rooted in personal knowledge and is gener-
ated through the specific engagement of the scientific (or any other) agent 
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with his or her daily activity. This kind of tacit (‘pre- verbal’) knowledge 
is difficult to articulate. The articulation or codification of knowledge has 
been the subject of intense debate among economists (see cowan et al., 
2000).
1.3 siTUaTEd and disTRibUTEd knowlEdgE
The third reason for the refusal to identify knowledge with information 
or codified knowledge was the distinction between situated and distrib-
uted knowledge. The theory of ‘situated cognition’ states that cognitive 
resources in the environment complement the cognition of agents and are 
exploited by them. knowledge is anchored not only in the mind, but also 
physically in the environment. This theoretical proposition was developed 
by suchman (1987), who emphasized that cognition is rooted inherently 
in action: that is, the physical, technological or social environment is 
essential for building human knowledge. suchman’s analysis suggests that 
the spatial arrangement of the environment (notably a specific division of 
labour and local division of tasks) is decisive for understanding human 
problem- solving capabilities (lorenz, 2001). nooteboom (chapter 15 in 
this volume), demonstrates why situated cognition departs from the rep-
resentational vision of knowledge described by newell and simon (1964). 
it suggests that cognitive structure is not fixed, but is built in action, and 
that knowledge is local in character because it can be understood fully 
only within a specific context. in chapter 15 nooteboom quotes Polanyi 
(1962) in arguing: ‘situated action entails that knowledge and meaning are 
embedded in specific contexts of action, which yield background knowl-
edge, as part of absorptive capacity, which cannot be fully articulated, and 
always retain a “tacit dimension”.’
This vision is shared by advocates of the notion of ‘community of 
practice’ (brown and duguid, 1991; lave and wenger, 1991, wenger 
and snyder, 2000), proposed by researchers at the Palo alto institute for 
Research on learning in the 1980s. a community of practice is defined as 
a group of people bound by informal links, engaged and interested in a 
common practice. They develop knowledge in action through practice and 
a shared language and common understandings, which most of the time 
remain tacit and implicit for most of the community.
in chapter 18 of this volume amin and cohendet discuss why com-
munity provides some degree of coordination during knowledge creation:
communities are thus ‘suppliers’ of sense and collective beliefs for the agents 
and play a central role of coordination in the organization. The community 
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framework provides the context within which are built the collective beliefs 
and the reference systems that structure individual choice. adopting the idea 
that knowledge creation is primarily realized in contexts of action and that the 
action is always collective, the consideration of the intermediate level of com-
munities is thus necessary to focus on the learning in the processes of action 
(dupouët and laguecir, 2001).
situated and distributed cognition are separate and complementary. what 
distinguishes these two visions of knowledge is the role of the cultural 
determinant in the cognitive process (lorenz, 2001). Edwin Hutchins, 
a famous american researcher in the field, subscribes to these views. 
Hutchins (1986) sees cognition as occurring via technological artefacts and 
social interactions, and human cognition as being mediated by techno-
logical artefacts that act as external memory (part of the cultural heritage 
of humankind). individuals in interaction with their environment solve 
problems and perform particular tasks by exploiting these technological 
tools. cognition is mediated through such tools and distributed via arte-
facts through a specific ‘agencement’ and social interaction (e.g. in the Us 
navy the channels for the transmission of knowledge are mostly formal 
rules and organizational relations). External memory affects the process 
of routinization by introducing new knowledge and new tasks into the 
division of labour. artefacts create new kinds of memory that facilitate 
cognitive activities, and enable the articulation of formerly tacit practices, 
through common references (lazaric et al., 2003).
1.4 sUbJEcTiVE and disPERsEd knowlEdgE
The division of labour and dispersion of knowledge chimes with the 
Hayekian vision of cognition. in this perspective, knowledge is conceived 
not only as being distributed relative to one’s sensory- motor system, but 
also as being distributed in time and space (lazaric and lorenz, 2003). 
according to Hayek (1945), the dispersed and locally contextualized nature 
of knowledge makes it quite impossible to centralize all economic decision 
making. Hayek provides a subjectivist interpretation of this dispersion 
of knowledge based on two main reasons. The first, which is cognitive, is 
discussed in The Sensory Order (Hayek, 1952), where Hayek champions 
the idea that the brain functions in a connectionist way. This means that 
the point of departure for a mental representation is not the physical 
order of things, as ‘scientistic objectivism’ (to use Hayek’s  expression – cf. 
Hayek, 1952, ch. V), would have it, ‘but the product of abstractions which 
the mind must possess in order to be capable of experiencing that rich-
ness of the particular [of the reality]’ (Hayek, 1978, p. 44). The conscious 
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experiences that individuals regard as relatively concrete and primary and 
that are attributed to the intrinsic properties of the physical order ‘are the 
product of a superimposition of many “classifications” of the events per-
ceived according to their significance in many respects’ (ibid., p. 36). Thus 
there are as many subjective forms of knowledge as there are individual 
‘nervous systems’, that is, as there are individual heterogeneous agents. 
The second justification for Hayekian subjectivism is found in what Hayek 
calls the ‘social division of knowledge’. for Hayek, as a civilization devel-
ops, the knowledge of its society becomes more complex and specialized. 
However, no single agent has access to all this knowledge: it is dispersed 
within and among the individuals constituting society, who have access 
to very small parts of this social knowledge and especially to the proc-
esses by which social and economic activity is regulated and reproduced 
globally. Hayek’s subjectivist methodological choice led him to investigate 
the features of a ‘cognitive’ individual rationality. The cognitive capacities 
that individual agents must mobilize refer to their ‘mental maps’. Hayek 
describes these ‘maps’ as a ‘semi- permanent apparatus of classification’, 
which ‘provides the different generic elements from which the models of 
particular situations are built’ (Hayek, 1952, p. 89). The notion of a mental 
map conveys the idea of cognitive limits to the mental considerations of 
individuals. Rather than ‘a sort of schematic picture of the environment’, 
mental maps act as ‘a sort of inventory of the kinds of things of which the 
world is built up, a theory of how the world works’ (ibid.).
1.5 knowlEdgE and RaTionaliTY
nooteboom (2006) suggests that various visions for considering learning 
and knowledge can be endorsed. The french philosopher blaise Pascal, 
writing in the seventeenth century, made the distinction between ‘esprit 
de géométrie’, ‘which abstracts drastically from reality to enable grip for 
rigorous formal reasoning and an “esprit de finesse”, which stays closer 
to complex reality, that allows less for formal analysis’ (nooteboom, 
2006, p. 3). simonian and Hayekian interpretations of knowledge and 
information differ. alan newell and Herbert simon (1964) developed 
the perfect illustration of ‘esprit de géométrie’, that is, a classic statement 
of the information- processing or physical symbol system view of human 
cognition and knowledge. The basic premises of this approach are that 
knowledge consists of rule- based representations or collections of abstract 
symbols that are stored in the mind, and that problem solving can be 
understood in terms of search procedures that select among means to 
transform the initial into the goal state. This view of human knowledge 
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and problem solving underlies newell and simon’s (1964, pp. 282–3) 
claim that, at the level of information processing, the computer and 
the human mind are comparable. They justifies their epistemological 
stance by suggesting that computer simulation techniques can be used 
to provide psychologically realistic characterizations of human problem- 
solving behaviours, which contrasts with Hayek’s vision of knowledge as 
more strongly rooted in a traditional ‘esprit de finesse’, that is, a vision of 
knowledge that goes beyond its symbolic representation.
However, it is the simonian representation of knowledge and the pro-
cedural rationality it legitimizes that contributes most to improving our 
deliberations over decision making. This symbolic approach to cognition 
is adopted explicitly by several economists, notably Egidi (1992, p. 154), 
for whom ‘a problem is represented by means of a symbolic structure . . . 
and finding a solution means finding the program or procedure which leads 
to a solution’. drawing on newell and simon’s (1972) classic discussion of 
human problem solving, Egidi argues that in searching for a solution indi-
viduals use conjectures to decompose a problem into a set of presumably 
solvable sub- problems. This conjectural division of problem solving gives 
rise to a division of knowledge that is efficient because it economizes on 
memory and thinking. Herbert simon’s information- processing approach 
to human cognition naturally gives rise to an understanding of knowl-
edge and learning as symbolic expressions stored within the minds of the 
organization’s members. This symbolic way of storing and representing 
knowledge at the individual level may explain interference in the decision- 
making process in a context of bounded rationality. it refers to decision 
making in a context of incomplete information.
1.5.1 The Frame Effect
in economics, framing effects emerged in relation to observed occurrences 
of fairness in subjects’ behaviour in experiments. frey and bohnet (1995) 
suggest that we need to examine institutionalist elements to observe the 
impact of fairness on economic outcomes. framing effects are defined 
as ‘norms, perspectives, contexts and other social cultural elements’ 
(Elliot et al., 1998, p. 456) and refer more generally to the way decisions 
are presented and how they shape human judgements in specific set-
tings. kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that framing effects are a 
preliminary stage that precedes the decision problem, the second stage 
being the period of evaluation. They define framing effects as ‘the manner 
in which the choice problem is presented .  .  . [according to the] norms, 
habits, and expectancies of the decision maker’ (kahneman and Tversky, 
1981, p. 455). Thus framing effects represent the heuristics interplaying in 
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the decision- making process before the problem is solved (gabaix et al., 
2001). This means that, underlying many of our intuitive inferences, are 
representativeness, availability and anchoring.
This is not a new idea. The social sciences refer to it as cognitive frame-
works, which result from internal processes and the local and cultural 
environment (bandura, 1986; witt, 1999). cognitive frameworks are the 
outcome of the co- constitution of action and perception, proposed in 
the constructivist approach (see notably weick, 1979, on this dimension). 
for boulding (1956), images play this role of intermediation between the 
perception of raw data and the internal value system. Every human action 
is induced by the person’s image, which, in turn, may be revised by the 
action. images provide a way to interpret information and make sense of 
the environment. They create temporarily stable cognitive frameworks 
with individual and collective regularities. for instance, in chapter 6 
of this volume, Patalano says: ‘individual imagery has a relevant social 
function because it enables collective sharing of values and meanings . . . 
the image has cohesive power that may exert a strategic function in both 
organizational contexts and cooperative interaction.’
1.6 knowlEdgE, lEaRning and RoUTinEs
in the historical evolutionary economics debate, collective learning rests 
on individual habits, routines and other types of more or less formalized 
practices (commons, 1934; Veblen, 1914). Veblen developed an anthropo-
logical approach to capitalism and believed that it evolved with technical 
and social changes (Veblen, 1904, 1914). from this perspective, the ques-
tion is not how a set of behaviours or actions becomes stable and balanced 
over time, but how it evolves (Veblen, 1919, p. 8). individuals have certain 
habits and behaviours that are conditioned by experience (ibid., p. 79), 
which is why the cumulative and self- reinforcing process of a set of rou-
tines and habits on which the economic order rests needs to be depicted. 
These habits and propensities, embedded in social structures, tend to 
reproduce themselves, hence the potential for inertia.
interest in the notion of routines was reawakened by nelson and 
winter’s (1982) work, which highlights the relative permanence of firm 
behaviours, but also the capacity of firms to innovate. The notion of 
routine is increasingly used to analyse microeconomic change (becker et al., 
2005). Therefore a re- examination of the role of institutions would allow us 
to identify and understand the forces behind these changes, which are not 
related exclusively to cognitive contingencies (nelson and sampat, 2001).
The interplay of the individual and the collective levels of action is 
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far from neutral (dopfer, 2007). for instance, entrepreneurs shape their 
judgements, beliefs and acts by themselves, but also in interaction with 
others. These micro interactions can produce ‘recurrent interacting pat-
terns’ that need to be observed carefully (cohen et al., 1996). commons 
(1934, 1950) proposed an interactions taxonomy based on the type of 
knowledge involved (see dutraive, chapter 13 this volume). ‘Routine 
transactions’ are related to habitual activities involving stabilized knowl-
edge (embodied in rules); ‘strategic transactions’ are those related to novel 
situations requiring new practices and implying new opportunities, for 
which there is no stabilized knowledge or rule of thumb. in other words, 
routine transactions are stabilized procedures that are deeply entrenched 
in the entrepreneur’s procedural memory, while strategic transactions 
are related to new ways of doing things, not yet classified by the human 
mind. for commons, the processes of deliberation and calculation are 
not always mobilized, but may rely on past habits when they are appro-
priate. in certain circumstances, the mind may reveal ‘a creative agency 
looking towards the future and manipulating the external world and other 
people in view of expected consequences’ (commons, 1934, p. 7; see also 
Hodgson, 1988). Thus institutions must be understood as the working 
rules of collective action that may restrain individual deliberation and can 
play a cognitive role by creating ‘institutionalized minds’ and ‘institution-
alized personalities’ (commons, 1934, p. 874).
both commons and Veblen invite us to scrutinize the mechanisms of 
change brought about by the individuals (the ‘upward causation’ that 
has an impact on the organization), and the changes within the organiza-
tion (the ‘reconstitutive downward causation’ that affects the individual) 
(Hodgson, 2007, p. 108). Routines lie between these two levels of analysis 
because they are enacted by individuals in a social context, which regulates 
the relative level of autonomy (becker et al., 2005; see also giddens, 1984).
This interplay of the individual and collective dimensions is described in 
the literature in terms of entrepreneurs not always able to take the ‘best’ 
decision because of the amount of unreliable information. They may need 
to employ heuristics derived from other contexts in order to analyse the 
competitive structure of the environment (Porac and Thomas, 1990). The 
entrepreneur’s images are framed by collective actions within the local 
environment, which may ‘tie’ them, not because of the entrepreneur’s own 
cognitive limits, but because of the vast quantity of information available 
that may not be relevant to the decision involved. This may promote the 
adoption of mimetic behaviours to deal with the uncertainty in forming 
personal judgements (greve, 1998). mimetic local behaviour, in some cir-
cumstances, may avoid the necessity of weighing up all the possible actions 
(kahneman, 2003), based on voluntary ignorance of some facts and data 
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and also on the willingness to reduce the level of learning and the infor-
mation search costs (kirzner, 1979). This localized learning – induced by 
various vicarious learning processes – occurs at the level of industry and 
also at the local level (maskell and malmberg, 2007). it can induce a delib-
erate unwillingness to absorb new knowledge in order to avoid redefinition 
of deeply entrenched procedural knowledge to match the current vision 
(see chapter 7 by lazaric in this volume, on the discussion and definition 
of declarative and procedural knowledge). This willingness to continue 
with ‘routine transactions’ and steer clear of creating new ‘strategic trans-
actions’ is exemplified by the famous exploration/ exploitation dilemma 
(levinthal and march, 1993; greve, 2007). The compromise required 
shows that exploitation not only increases the probability of repeating 
organizational routines, but simultaneously avoids exploration by reduc-
ing the resources available for research. innovation may arise from an 
innovator modifying current thinking on the economic activity thanks 
to the emergence of less stereotyped images in some specific context (see 
chapter 6 by Patalano, this volume).
Regularities are rooted in ‘cognitive automatisms’, which are generated 
by the stabilization of the ‘procedural knowledge’ that allows faster mem-
orization in circumstances that appear to be similar (bargh, 1997; cohen 
and bacdayan, 1994). These potential automatisms, which are rooted also 
in ‘declarative knowledge’, that is, the representational level, help human 
beings to identify predictable behaviour in dynamic environments and to 
integrate some plasticity into the solving of new problems not yet memo-
rized (see lazaric, 2008, for a longer discussion). images are part of this 
system because they produce regularities inside the procedural knowledge 
as well as new insights in the declarative knowledge that are not always put 
into practice – that is, transformed by the mind into a purposeful cognitive 
act.
mindful reflexivity (langer and moldoveanu, 2000) and motivation 
related to organizational change are necessary, but not always sufficient, 
to overcome these obstacles (Howard- grenvillle, 2005). This implies 
that motivational factors within current practices should accord with the 
change introduced at the cognitive level. The perception and image of 
change are crucial and relate to both the declarative and procedural forms 
of knowledge, that is, to the representation of change and its effective 
implementation. in this perspective, changes to routines should not be seen 
as fateful coincidences related to external and disruptive factors, but as 
ingredients crucial for the revitalization of individuals and organizations.
This echoes recent research on organizations, about mindfulness, or 
attention to weak cues and learning from rare events (Rerup, 2005), 
and the place of mindful and less mindful attitudes as necessary for 
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organizations to evolve and survive. indeed, ‘learning to be surprised’, 
that is, reflection in action in a context of high- reliability organizations, 
seems vital for their adaptation (Jordan, 2010). in this latter approach, 
sense making is important at the individual and collective levels and is not 
always opposed to organizational routines (Rerup and feldman, 2011). 
Thus attention becomes critical and induces some reflexivity on routines. 
mindfulness matters and materializes by the intention and capacity to 
absorb change – at both the motivational and cognitive levels (Huet and 
lazaric, 2008; lazaric et al., 2008). in the field of interest here, a mindful 
attitude can be defined as the capacity to go beyond routine transactions 
in order to change the procedural knowledge embedded in entrepreneurs’ 
minds and ways of doing things. a mindful attitude is the explorative 
behaviour that must be adopted to generate a strategic transaction, that 
is, a transaction that is not always known in advance and that may trigger 
unpredictable change inside the organization.
1.7 conTEnT of THE VolUmE
Part i of this Handbook provides a historical perspective on how knowl-
edge is dealt with in various economic traditions.
chapter 2 by ludovic Ragni re- evaluates Pareto’s contribution to 
economics and sociology in the light of the current literature on the role 
of knowledge and beliefs in economic relations. more precisely, Pareto’s 
action theory is described as pioneering work in the field now referred 
to as cognitive or behavioural economics, and focused on how people 
acquire and treat information, and elaborate beliefs or ways of think-
ing by interacting with each other. it is interesting that Pareto’s focus on 
human behaviour is the result of a methodological perspective that tries to 
integrate other disciplines such as psychology or sociology into economic 
analysis.
brian loasby’s contribution (chapter 3) is devoted to marshall’s 
view of knowledge and its centrality in his explanation of how economic 
systems work. beyond the traditional reasons why marshall focused on 
knowledge (observation of the remarkable industrial developments that 
occurred during his lifetime and that rested on the organization of the 
growth and application of knowledge, and his desire for improvements in 
the condition of the people), loasby refers to marshall’s ‘kind of intellec-
tual crisis’ in discussing the sources and reliability of human knowledge. 
This crisis, which is documented by Tiziano Raffaelli (2003), led marshall 
to develop his own model of an evolutionary, contingent and fallible 
process by which the human brain could develop classification systems 
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for interpreting phenomena and planning action. like Hayek, marshall 
emphasized the limitations to human cognition and the importance of 
organization in the coordination of economic activities.
in chapter 4, agnès festré discusses the role of knowledge in the 
austrian tradition. while it has become common now to refer to Hayek’s 
pioneering work on the relation between economics and knowledge (see 
section 1.1 above), other austrian economists have not endured to the 
same extent, although their contributions to our understanding of how 
knowledge moulds behaviour and helps to coordinate economic activities 
are far from being negligible. it is especially interesting that the work of 
the founding father of the austrian school, carl menger, paved the way to 
various attempts to deal with the role of knowledge in economic activities. 
This chapter contrasts menger’s conception of knowledge with that of his 
direct successor, friedrich von wieser, and shows that, although they had 
a shared interest in how institutions emerge in an environment character-
ized by individual heterogeneity, time and spatial constraints, they devel-
oped divergent perspectives of institutional dynamics.
along similar lines, Véronique dutraive argues in chapter 5 that old 
american institutionalism, in particular Veblen and commons, antici-
pated some of the trends of contemporary economic analysis in dealing 
with the interactions between knowledge, cognition and institutions (e.g. 
denzau and north, 1994). dutraive stresses that Veblen and commons, 
building on american pragmatist philosophy, pioneered the focus on 
the importance of the interaction with institutions and mental proc-
esses for our understanding of the dynamics of economic phenom-
ena in modern  societies, and made early claims that economics must 
 interact  with  other  sciences – and particularly with the psychological 
sciences.
Roberta Patalano’s contribution (chapter 6) analyses more deeply how 
mental representations and knowledge interfere, by focusing on kenneth 
boulding’s theory of action in The Image (boulding, 1956), a work often 
neglected by economists, which is based on perception and imagination. 
Patalano makes a comparison with Hayek’s theory of knowledge devel-
oped in The Sensory Order (1952), to show that both authors anticipated 
some modern developments in economics (cognitive economics, neuro- 
economics), and to emphasize the relevance of the neuro- psychological 
and psychic underpinnings of economic behaviour that emerged over half 
a century ago. while some of the ideas proposed by boulding, and espe-
cially by Hayek, have been developed using modern instruments, others 
have been neglected and would be worth rediscovery. Roberta Patalano 
argues that the most significant one might be imagination, that is, the 
attitude of mind involved in framing situations and developing images of 
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what might happen in the future. she argues that this notion should be 
investigated in order to clarify its influence, in economic terms, on indi-
vidual and collective behaviour.
in chapter 7 salvatore Rizzello and anna spada focus on the debates 
of the 1950s that opposed the defenders of rational choice theory and 
those interested in developing new tools, which constituted the ground for 
a psychology- based theory of decision. Rizzello and spada argue that the 
problem of uncertainty in decision making is at the core of the debate on 
economic decision making, while knowledge is often regarded as implicit, 
that is, as a method of facing uncertainty, or is neglected. Here, simon’s 
work is illuminating because he regarded knowledge as connected to 
procedural rationality. Unlike those gET economists who focused on 
information and risk (see section 1.1 above), simon took up the challenge 
to address the problem of uncertainty and developed a theory of decision 
making grounded on the concept of ‘pragmatic’ rationality, which is built 
around human knowledge.
Part ii of the book deals with the conceptions, role and use of knowl-
edge in economics in general.
chapter 8 by giovanni dosi provides an overview of the contribution 
of economic theory to the understanding of knowledge- based economies, 
observing that all economies that we know were profoundly knowledge- 
based as much as a century ago and are still so today. However, he also 
argues that there is a need to develop an adequate toolkit in order to iden-
tify what distinguishes the contemporary role of knowledge (in relation to 
basic economic mechanisms of demand formation, accumulation, employ-
ment generation etc.) from what marshall and schumpeter were observ-
ing a century earlier. although recent developments in the economics of 
information and of innovation have brought important insights into the 
processes of generation and diffusion of knowledge, and their economic 
consequences, many streams of macroeconomic analysis are being very 
slow to adopt them.
massimo Egidi’s contribution (chapter 9) discusses the many attempts 
to provide cognitive foundations to the limitations of (conscious) ration-
ality. He points out that this trend has been hampered by Harrod’s 
(1939) evolutionary justification of marginalist economic rationality, and 
friedman’s (1953) positivist methodology (his ‘as if ’ hypothesis), which 
completely disregards the psychological aspects of decision making since, 
in this view, even low individual awareness is not supposed to be incom-
patible with full rationality. This ‘cognitive gap’ could be reduced, even in 
an evolutionary perspective, through the provision of cognitive founda-
tions to a bounded- rationality approach to decision making. The solu-
tion offered along these lines is related to the question of consciousness 
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and, ultimately, to the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge. 
This distinction may be cognitively grounded through reference to the 
distinction between conscious and effortful and automatic and effortless 
reasoning, as described by many cognitive psychologists such as daniel 
kahneman.
chapter 10 by Pier Paolo saviotti provides a characterization of the 
processes of knowledge generation and utilization, something that is 
missing from the economic literature despite the growing interest in 
knowledge for innovation and economic development in the so- called 
knowledge- based societies. This description uses a theoretical framework 
to represent, model and measure knowledge. it is based on two properties 
of knowledge: (a) as a co- relational structure, meaning that knowledge 
generally involves connections between variables making it possible to 
deduce the value of unknown variable from the value of known or linked 
variables; (b) as a retrieval/interpretative structure. This is not a complete 
representation of knowledge, but is intended to help interpret the collec-
tive processes of knowledge creation and utilization involving different 
types of organizations (firms, public research institutes, universities etc.) 
and taking place in knowledge- based economies.
chapter 11 by Jacques durieu and Philippe solal provides an overview 
of the literature on learning in evolutionary game- theory. The hypoth-
eses commonly related to game- theory models are bounded rationality 
justified by lack of information about the game structure (payoff func-
tions or the rationality of other players), and a stationary environment in 
order to simplify the decision task. The authors distinguish between two 
kinds of models depending on hypotheses concerning the behaviour of 
the other players: one family of models assumes that agents do not elabo-
rate their beliefs about their opponents’ behaviour; the other considers 
that agents form (naive) expectations about their opponents’ future play. 
for each category of adaptive learning models, the authors show that 
repetition of physical interaction among agents can overcome the prob-
lems of lack of strategic information and the limitations of rationality, 
suggesting that knowledge acquisition is embedded in inter- individual 
interactions.
chapter 12 by dominique foray deals with experiential knowledge 
defined as a kind of knowledge that springs from the experience of indi-
viduals and organizations, which is local and specific, sound, rational 
and effective, although it does not have the status of scientific knowledge. 
knowing how wind flows vary can help to avoid forest fires is an instance 
of experiential knowledge. The properties of experienced knowledge (it is 
local, disturbing and disruptive) lead to specific problems (deterioration, 
disinvention and deactivation) that can jeopardize the community, in 
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particular when experienced knowledge is collective (to be distinguished 
from private experienced knowledge, like a trade secret).
bengt- Åke lundvall (chapter 13) provides a critical assessment of 
the policy maker’s concept of knowledge base, and proposes the idea of 
numerous separate knowledge pools that constitute ‘community resources’ 
that are not easily transformed into private property. This concept of 
knowledge pools could inspire innovation policy in both the more and less 
developed parts of the world. for example, in developing countries there 
is a need to build absorptive capacity in order to access the knowledge 
pools in the richer parts of the world, and an accompanying general need 
to reconsider the rules of the game related to intellectual property rights. 
in the rich countries, finding ways to connect specific separate pools of 
knowledge could be seen as key to stimulating radical innovation by 
exploiting knowledge diversity.
andré orléan’s contribution (chapter 14) is a tribute to keynes’s out-
standing work on collective knowledge or beliefs and their criticality for 
economic decision making in conditions of uncertainty. This approach 
is at odds with economic and financial theory that relies on objective 
values (e.g. the fundamental value of securities) and deriving efficiency 
theorems (e.g. the informational efficiency hypothesis of fama), and 
takes it for granted that those objective values exist. This oversimplifi-
cation explains why many financial models cannot provide satisfactory 
explanations for phenomena such as financial bubbles. it is also not 
consistent with the idea that (financial) markets improve or even trans-
form the functioning of the economy. orléan advocates for a conven-
tionalist approach to finance, which differs from the standard approach 
that  considers the knowledge that agents are capable of producing in 
relation to the future development of the economy. Rather than con-
sidering finance as an a priori fact resulting from an objectively defined 
future, we should conceive it as the contingent product of opinion- based 
reasoning.
Part iii extends the contributions in Part ii, focusing more closely on 
the role of knowledge in organizations.
bart nooteboom’s contribution (chapter 15) is centred on the debate 
over the notion of ‘embodied cognition’ (cf. section 1.3 above). The notion 
of embodied cognition refers to Polanyi’s concept of ‘personal knowledge’ 
defined as knowledge rooted in an agent’s body that is physically posi-
tioned and interacting with the world. consequently, the embodiment of 
cognition entails a continuum rather than a cartesian duality between 
rational evaluation, feelings and underlying physiological processes in the 
body. This perspective has far- reaching implications for economics and 
management, and enables improved understanding of the ‘knowledge 
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economy’ and the ‘network economy’. clearly, if knowledge arises from 
interaction with others, in a ‘knowledge economy’ interaction between 
firms in networks becomes crucial.
in chapter 16, Ulrich witt, Tom brökel and Thomas brenner offer a 
conceptual clarification of the economic properties of knowledge. They 
evaluate the many distinctions that economists have used to describe the 
characteristics of knowledge, starting from Polanyi’s distinction between 
implicit and explicit knowledge, through the difference between encoded 
and non- encoded knowledge, to the different categorizations of knowledge 
as a public good, a locally public good or a private good. in accordance 
with evolutionary approaches, the authors show that the characteristics of 
knowledge should not be viewed as intrinsic since they depend strongly on 
the state of the knowledge technology, that is, on how knowledge can be 
acquired, stored, used and communicated.
Paul nightingale focuses in chapter 17 on the notion of tacit knowl-
edge, discussing its topicality and relevance, mentioning the many findings 
in the neurosciences that support it, exemplified by experiences led by 
damasio (1994) on ‘somatic markers’ and Edelman (1992) on learning. 
nightingale argues, in line with Polanyi’s reasoning, that the concept 
of tacit knowledge should be used to move explanations outwards from 
agents, and to become a foundation for understanding the more complex 
causal processes at work, rather than a variable that explains everything. 
He concludes that tacit knowledge is a useful concept when used properly, 
but its flexibility means that it can be used to explain ‘anything’ or to 
justify any policy position.
in chapter 18 ash amin and Patrick cohendet discuss knowledge 
shared by communities of practice (brown and duguid, 1991), defined as 
group of people bound together by informal links engaged in a common 
practice. The community framework provides the context within which 
collective beliefs and reference systems that structure individual choice 
are built. This supports the conception of knowledge creation anchored in 
collective action, and its consideration permits a better understanding of 
the learning processes at work at intermediate levels in the firm’s organiza-
tional structure. This has strong implications for knowledge management. 
for instance, it could mean that firms should devote great attention and 
energy in order to benefit from the ‘spontaneous or intentional emergence 
of the cognitive platforms’ that are vital for innovation and creativity 
inside the firm.
mie augier and Thorbjørn knudsen (chapter 19) take up the chal-
lenge of modelling knowledge organization by introducing a new, 
unifying way of thinking about the organization of knowledge. The 
organization of knowledge is conceived as an architecture whose design 
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requires consideration of the cognitive skills of potential employees, 
the distribution of alternatives available in the business environment, 
and the costs associated with alternative modes of employment. like 
simon and march, augier and knudsen view organizations as helping 
economic agents to take decisions by constraining the set of alternatives. 
in a context of low communication costs and increased connectivity of 
various media, phenomena commonly associated with the knowledge 
economy, an investigation of what kind of architecture is the most 
appropriate to help boundedly rational agents to make better choices 
and avoid costly, irreversible decisions is a crucial theoretical and 
empirical issue.
chapter 20 by markus becker offers an in- depth investigation of the 
implications of distributed knowledge for organizations, distinguish-
ing between different types of architectures, that is, different ways of 
linking people depending on the degree of specialization and the degree 
of overlap in the knowledge held by agents. a serious difficulty arises 
in the attempt to disentangle the effects due to the relation between the 
dispersion of knowledge and the division of labour from the whole set 
of non- ambiguous effects of the dispersion of knowledge on organiza-
tions. although the dispersion of knowledge has been acknowledged by 
many economists (in particular smith and Hayek) as a fundamental theo-
retical issue, and has given rise to many applications in management (e.g. 
Taylorism), the problem of its coordination (including its coordination in 
time) is deserving of more attention.
The Handbook concludes with a chapter by nathalie lazaric that 
explores what drives change in knowledge. lazaric draws on anderson’s 
(1983) distinction between declarative and procedural memory, and recent 
findings in the cognitive sciences. she tries to disentangle the cognitive 
mechanisms by which declarative memory, that is, a form of memory 
that is focused mainly on the recollection of facts or events, can be con-
verted into procedural memory, that is, a form of memory that concerns 
how things are done or the knowledge that is put to use. both kinds 
of memory are subject to change and are intertwined, corroborated by 
the work of shiffrin and schneider (1977) and kahneman (2003) on the 
relation between automatic and deliberately controlled forms of cogni-
tive processes. lazaric draws an analogy between the individual and the 
organizational levels. although individual and organizational forms of 
memorization are distinct, their theorization involves similar difficul-
ties: how are representations made to change? How can a repertoire of 
knowledge that is used daily be changed and improved? and how can new 
knowledge be created?
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